he sum proposed
to be given him for prompt payment. I can attribute your conduct on this
occasion, to nothing excepting the most inconsiderate indiscretion, and
to a desire to benefit yourself, which got the better of your prudence.
I desire, however, that you will refrain from the subject with the Rajah
of Kittoor at all, and that if he should renew it, you will inform him,
that I and all British officers consider such offers as insults on the
part of them by whom made.

_Letter to an officer in India, January 20, 1803._

_Principle of Warfare in India._

We must get the upper hand, and if once we have that, we shall keep it
with ease, and shall certainly succeed. But if we begin by a long
defensive warfare, and go looking after convoys that are scattered over
the face of the earth, and do not attack briskly, we shall soon be in
distress.

_Dispatch, Aug. 17, 1803._

* * * * *

_How to avoid Party Spirit in the Army._

It occurs to me that there is much party in the army in your quarter;
this must be put an end to. And there is only one mode of effecting
this, and that is for the commanding officer to be of no side excepting
that of the public; to employ indiscriminately those who can best serve
the public, be they who they may, or in whatever service; the
consequence will be that the service will go on, all parties will join
in forwarding it, and in respecting him; there will be an end to their
petty disputes about trifles; and the commanding officer will be at the
head of an army instead of a party.

_Letter to an officer, Sept. 16, 1803._

* * * * *

_The power of the Sword necessary in India._

It is necessary that the political agents at the durbars of the native
princes should be supposed to have a considerable degree of power. In
this part of the world there is no power excepting that of the sword;
and it follows that if these political agents have no authority over the
military, they have no power whatever.

The natives would soon find out this state of weakness, and the
residents would lose their influence over their councils. It may be
argued if that is the case, the military commanding officer ought to be
the resident, or political agent. In answer to this argument, I say,
that the same reasoning applies to every part of the executive
government; and that, upon this ground, the whole ought to be in the
hands of the military. In sho