ny special
action of the lodge, but simply by the termination of the period for which
the party was suspended. He then at once reenters into the possession of
all the rights, benefits, and functions, from which he had been
temporarily suspended.

I have myself no doubt of the correctness of this principle; but, as it
has been denied by some writers, although a very large majority of the
authorities are in its favor, it may be well, briefly, to discuss its
merits.

Let us suppose that on the 1st of January A.B. had been suspended for
three months, that is, until the 1st day of April. At the end of the three
months, that is to say, on the first of April, A.B. would no longer be a
suspended member--for the punishment decreed will have been endured; and
as the sentence of the lodge had expressly declared that his suspension
was to last until the 1st of April, the said sentence, if it means
anything, must mean that the suspension was, on the said 1st of April, to
cease and determine. If he were, therefore, to wait until the 1st of May
for the action of the lodge, declaring his restoration, he would suffer a
punishment of four months' suspension, which was not decreed by his lodge
upon his trial, and which would, therefore, be manifestly unjust and
illegal.

Again: if the offense which he had committed was, upon his trial, found to
be so slight as to demand only a dismissal for one night from the lodge,
will it be contended that, on his leaving the lodge-room pursuant to his
sentence, he leaves not to return to it on the succeeding communication,
unless a vote should permit him? Certainly not. His punishment of
dismissal for one night had been executed; and on the succeeding night he
reentered into the possession of all his rights. But if he can do so after
a dismissal or suspension of one night, why not after one or three, six or
twelve months? The time is extended, but the principle remains the same.

But the doctrine, that after the expiration of the term of a definite
suspension, an action by the lodge is still necessary to a complete
restoration, is capable of producing much mischief and oppression. For, if
the lodge not only has a right, but is under the necessity of taking up
the case anew, and deciding whether the person who had been suspended for
three months, and whose period of suspension has expired, shall now be
restored, it follows, that the members of the lodge, in the course of
their inquiry, are permitted