s told that he must again
undergo the ordeal of another trial, before another court, before he can
reassume what was only taken from him for a definite period; and that it
is still doubtful, whether the sentence of the former court may not even
now, after its accomplishment, be reversed, and a new and more severe one
be inflicted.

The analogy of a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment for a
certain period, and who, on the expiration of that period, is at once
released, has been referred to, as apposite to the case of a definite
suspension. Still more appropriately may we refer to the case of a person
transported for a term of years, and who cannot return until that term
expires, but who is at liberty at once to do so when it has expired.
"Another capital offense against public justice," says Blackstone, "is
the returning from transportation, or being seen at large in Great Britain
_before the expiration of the term for which the offender was sentenced to
be transported." _ Mark these qualifying words: "before the expiration of
the term:" they include, from the very force of language, the proposition
that it is no offense to return _after_ the expiration of the term. And so
changing certain words to meet the change of circumstances, but leaving
the principle unchanged, we may lay down the law in relation to
restorations from definite suspensions, as follows:

_It is an offense against the masonic code to claim the privileges of
Masonry, or to attempt to visit a lodge after having been suspended,
before the expiration of the term for which the offender was suspended_.

Of course, it is no crime to resume these privileges after the term has
expired; for surely he must have strange notions of the powers of
language, who supposes that suspension for three months, and no more, does
not mean, that when the three months are over the suspension ceases. And,
if the suspension ceases, the person is no longer suspended; and, if no
longer suspended he is in good standing, and requires no further action to
restore him to good moral and masonic health.

But it is said that, although originally only suspended for three months,
at the expiration of that period, his conduct might continue to be such as
to render his restoration a cause of public reproach. What is to be done
in such a case? It seems strange that the question should be asked. The
remedy is only too apparent. Let new charges be preferred, and let a new
trial tak