ion upon the merits of any particular case.

Blackstone, whose method of teaching I have endeavored, although I confess
"ab longo inter-vallo," to pursue, in speaking of what an academical
expounder of the law should do, says:

"He should consider his course as a general map of the law, marking out
the shape of the country, its connections, and boundaries, its greater
divisions, and principal cities; it is not his business to describe
minutely the subordinate limits, or to fix the longitude and latitude of
every inconsiderable hamlet."

Such has been the rule that has governed me in the compilation of this
work. But in delineating this "general map" of the Masonic Law, I have
sought, if I may continue the metaphor, so to define boundaries, and to
describe countries, as to give the inspector no difficulty in "locating"
(to use an Americanism) any subordinate point. I have treated, it is true,
of principles, but I have not altogether lost sight of cases.

There are certain fundamental laws of the Institution, concerning which
there never has been any dispute, and which have come down to us with all
the sanctions of antiquity, and universal acceptation. In announcing
these, I have not always thought it necessary to defend their justice, or
to assign a reason for their enactment.

The weight of unanimous authority has, in these instances, been deemed
sufficient to entitle them to respect, and to obedience.

But on all other questions, where authority is divided, or where doubts of
the correctness of my decision might arise, I have endeavored, by a course
of argument as satisfactory as I could command, to assign a reason for my
opinions, and to defend and enforce my views, by a reference to the
general principles of jurisprudence, and the peculiar character of the
masonic system. I ask, and should receive no deference to my own
unsupported theories--as a man, I am, of course, fallible--and may often
have decided erroneously. But I do claim for my arguments all the weight
and influence of which they may be deemed worthy, after an attentive and
unprejudiced examination. To those who may at first be ready--because I do
not agree with all their preconceived opinions--to doubt or deny my
conclusions, I would say, in the language of Themistocles, "Strike, but
hear me."

Whatever may be the verdict passed upon my labors by my Brethren, I trust
that some clemency will be extended to the errors into which I may have
fallen, fo