usly considered this point. In America the term
Civil Service is applied equally to both groups of offices, and 'Civil
Service principles' are understood to cover State and Municipal as well
as Federal appointments. The separation of the two systems in our minds
may, indeed, be largely due to the mere accident that from historical
reasons we call them by different names. As it is, the local authorities
are (with the exception that certain qualifications are required for
teachers and medical officers) left free to do as they will in making
appointments. Perhaps half a dozen Metropolitan and provincial local
bodies have adopted timid and limited schemes of open competition. But
in all other cases the local civil servants, who are already probably as
numerous as those of the central government,[93] are appointed under
conditions which, if the Government chose to create a Commission of
Inquiry, would probably be found to have reproduced many of the evils
that existed in the patronage of the central government before 1855.

[93] The figures in the census of 1901 were--National, 90,000; Local,
71,000. But the local officials since then have, I believe, increased
much more rapidly than the national.

It would not, of course, be possible to appoint a separate body of Civil
Service Commissioners to hold a separate examination for each locality,
and difficulties would arise from the selection of officials by a body
responsible only to the central government, and out of touch with the
local body which controls, pays, and promotes them when appointed. But
similar difficulties have been obviated by American Civil Service
Reformers, and a few days' hard thinking would suffice to adapt the
system to English local conditions.

One object aimed at by the creation of a competitive Civil Service for
the central government in England was the prevention of corruption. It
was made more difficult for representatives and officials to conspire
together in order to defraud the public, when the official ceased to owe
his appointment to the representative. If an English member of
parliament desired now to make money out of his position, he would have
to corrupt a whole series of officials in no way dependent on his
favour, who perhaps intensely dislike the human type to which he
belongs, and who would be condemned to disgrace or imprisonment years
after he had lost his seat if some record of their joint misdoing were
unearthed.

This precautio