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he law and constructed treason with the usual ingenuity of officials working by the job. Judge Kelyng's loose opinion that an attack on a brothel was high treason, was cited by Mr. Rawle, the District Attorney, as good law.[155] What "in England is called constructive levying of war, in this country must be called direct levying of war." Judge Peters charged that though force was necessary to constitute the crime of treason, yet "the quantum of force is immaterial," of course it may be wielding a wheat straw, or a word, I suppose. "The doctrine of constructive treason has produced much real mischief in another country" [England]. "The _greater part of the objections to it are irrelevant here_." [Footnote 155: Wharton, 539; Kelyng, R. 70, 75.] Fries was found guilty. His counsel moved for a new trial, on the ground that before the trial one of the jurors had declared, "Fries ought to be hung;" "I myself shall be in danger unless we hang them all;" that the jurors were irregularly drawn, and the trial was not held in the county where the offence was committed. Judge Iredell ruled that it was "_a high contempt_ at this time _to call for a renewal of an argument whereon a solemn, decisive opinion was delivered_." Judge Peters declared the juror had "said no more than all friends to the laws and the government were warranted in thinking and saying." Yet a new trial was granted. The new trial was held before Judge Chase, who had, as Mr. Wharton says, a "singular instinct for tumults which scents it at a distance ... and irresistibly impels a participation in it," "moving perpetually with a mob at his heels." Yet "apart from his criminal jurisdiction he was reckoned a wise and impartial judge, a master of the Common Law, and a thorough and indefatigable administrator of public functions." "It was this despotic ardor of temperament ... which made him, when a young man, employ with resolute audacity the engine of popular revolt, and which led him when older, and when in possession of that power against which he had so steadily warred, to wield with the same vigor the sword of constituted authority."[156] Gentlemen, he was like many that this Honorable Court perhaps have known, who were privateering Democrats in 1812, and Kidnapping Whigs in 1850. To him we are indebted for the invaluable decision that the United States courts have no Common Law jurisdiction. [Footnote 156: 4 Hildreth, 571; 1 Gibbs, 300; 2 Gibbs, 419.]
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