one hundred and fifty-four cannon,
of which one hundred and thirty-five were thirty-two pounders or above.
The two forts which constituted the principal defenses of New Orleans
against a naval attack from the sea were at Plaquemine Bend, about
twenty miles above the Head of the Passes; by which name is known the
point where the main stream of the Mississippi divides into several
channels, called passes, through which its waters find their way to the
Gulf. The river, whose general course below New Orleans is southeast,
turns at Plaquemine Bend northeast for a mile and three-quarters, and
then resumes its previous direction. The heavier of the two works, Fort
Jackson, is on the right bank, at the lower angle of the Bend. It was a
casemated brick structure, pentagonal in form, carrying in barbette over
the casemates twenty-seven cannon of and above the size of thirty-two
pounders, besides eleven twenty-four pounders. In the casemates were
fourteen of the latter caliber. Attached to this fort, but below it, was
a water battery carrying half a dozen heavy cannon. Fort St. Philip was
nearly opposite Fort Jackson, but somewhat below it, so as to command
not only the stream in its front, but also the stretch down the river,
being thus enabled to rake vessels approaching from below before they
came abreast. It comprised the fort proper and two water batteries,
which together mounted forty-two guns. The sites of these fortifications
had been skillfully chosen; but their armaments, though formidable and
greatly superior to those of the fleet--regard being had to the commonly
accepted maxim that a gun ashore is equivalent to four afloat--were not
equal to the demands of the situation or to the importance of New
Orleans. Out of a total of one hundred and nine pieces,[G] of which
probably over ninety could be used against a passing fleet, fifty-six,
or more than half, were of the very old and obsolete caliber of
twenty-four pounders.
[Footnote G: There were some guns bearing inland and some flanking
howitzers, besides those already enumerated.]
This inadequate preparation, a year after the attack upon Fort Sumter
and the outbreak of hostilities, is doubtless to be attributed to
surprise. The Southern authorities, like those of the National
Government, were firmly possessed with the idea that the Mississippi, if
subdued at all, must be so by an attack from the north. Despite the
frequency of spies and treason along the borde
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