the future operations of the venturesome enemy who dares to leave
it unsubdued behind him. Such, to some extent, was the Fort of Bard, in
the narrow pass of the Dora Baltea, to Napoleon's crossing of the St.
Bernard in 1800; and such, to some extent, would be Forts Jackson and
St. Philip to Farragut's fleet after it had fought its way above. The
Mississippi was the great line of communication for the fleet; no other
was comparable to it--except as a by-path in a mountain is comparable to
a royal highway--and the forts commanded the Mississippi. Their own
offensive power was limited to the range of their guns; their garrisons
were not fitted, either by their number or their aptitudes, for
offensive action upon the water; but so long as their food and
ammunition lasted, though an occasional vessel might run by them, no
steady stream of supplies, such as every armed organization needs, could
pass up the Mississippi. Finally, though the garrison could not move,
there lay behind or under the forts a number of armed vessels, whose
precise powers were unknown, but concerning which most exaggerated
rumors were current.

The question, therefore, looming before Farragut was precisely that
which had been debated before the President in Washington; precisely
that on which Fox had differed from Porter and Barnard. It was, again,
closely analogous to that which divided Sherman and Grant when the
latter, a year after Farragut ran by the forts, made his famous decision
to cut adrift from his communications by the upper Mississippi, to march
past Vicksburg by the west bank of the river, to cross below the works,
and so cut off the great stronghold of the Mississippi from the country
upon which it depended for food and re-enforcements.[I] But as Grant's
decision rested upon a balance of arguments applicable to the problem
before him, so did Farragut's upon a calculation of the risks and
advantages attendant, respectively, upon the policy of waiting for the
forts to fall, or of speeding by them to destroy the resources upon
which they depended.

[Footnote I: The following is Grant's account of a matter which,
but for Sherman's own zeal in proclaiming the merits of his
commander-in-chief, would probably have always remained unknown.
It would be difficult to find a closer parallel to the difference
of judgment existing between Farragut and Porter at New Orleans:
"When General Sherman first learned of the move I proposed to
m