ena (as, _e.g._, thought, feeling, volition,
etc.) is termed _mind_, or _mental substance_. We may, therefore, lay it
down as an undisputed truth that consciousness gives, as an ultimate
fact, a primitive duality--a knowledge of the _ego_ in relation and
contrast to the _non-ego_, and a knowledge of the _non-ego_ in relation
and contrast to the _ego_[285] Natural Dualism thus establishes the
existence of two worlds of _mind_ and _matter_ on the immediate
knowledge we possess of both series of phenomena; whilst the Cosmothetic
Idealists discredit the veracity of consciousness as to our immediate
knowledge of material phenomena, and, consequently, our _immediate
knowledge of the existence of matter_.[286]

[Footnote 283: Ibid., vol. i. p. 137.]

[Footnote 284: Ibid., vol. i. p. 137.]

[Footnote 285: Ibid., vol. i. p. 292.]

[Footnote 286: Ibid., vol. i. pp. 292, 295.]

The obvious doctrine of the above quotations is, that we have an
immediate knowledge of the "_existence_ of matter" as well as of "the
_phenomena_ of matter;" that is, we know "_substance_" as immediately
and directly as we know "_qualities_." Phenomena are known only as
inherent in substance; substance is known only as manifesting its
qualities. We never know qualities without knowing substance, and we can
never know substance without knowing qualities. Both are known in one
concrete act; substance is known quite as much as quality; quality is
known no more than substance. That we have a direct, immediate,
presentative "face to face" knowledge of matter and mind in every act of
consciousness is asserted again and again by Hamilton, in his
"Philosophy of Perception."[287] In the course of the discussion he
starts the question, "_Is the knowledge of mind and matter equally
immediate?_" His answer to this question may be condensed in the
following sentences. In regard to the immediate knowledge of _mind_
there is no difficulty; it is admitted to be direct and immediate. The
problem, therefore, exclusively regards the intuitive perception of the
qualities of _matter_. Now, says Hamilton, "if we interrogate
consciousness concerning the point in question, the response is
categorical and clear. In the simplest act of perception I am conscious
of _myself_ as a perceiving _subject_, and of an external _reality_ as
the object perceived; and I am conscious of both existences in the same
indivisible amount of intuition."[288] Again he says, "I have frequently
as