his predecessors made the
papacy great with arms he will render it still greater and more
venerable by his benignity and other countless virtues.

_III.--Of Maintaining a Princedom_

A prince must defend his state with either his own subjects or
mercenaries, or auxiliaries. Mercenaries are utterly untrustworthy; if
their captain be not an able man the prince will probably be ruined,
whereas if he be an able man he will be seeking a goal of his own. This
has been perpetually exemplified among the cities and states of Italy
which have sought to maintain themselves by taking foreigners into their
pay.

But he who would deprive himself of every chance of success should have
recourse to auxiliaries; that is, to the troops of a foreign potentate.
For these are far more dangerous than mercenary arms, bringing ruin with
them ready made. The better such troops are the more dangerous they are.
From Hiero of Syracuse to Cesare Borgia, princes have become powerful in
proportion as they could dispense with such aid and place their
dependence upon national troops.

A prince, then, who would be powerful should have no care or thought
but for war, lest he lose his dominions If he be ignorant of military
affairs he can neither be respected by the soldiers nor trust them.
Therefore, he must both practise and study this art. For the practise,
the chase in many respects provides an excellent training both in
knowledge of the country and in vigour of the body. As to study, a
prince should read histories, note the actions of great men, and examine
the causes of their victories and defeats; seeking to imitate those who
have been renowned.

Anyone who would act up to a perfect standard of goodness in everything
must be ruined among so many who are not good. It is essential therefore
for a prince to have learnt how to be other than good, and to use, or
not to use, his goodness as necessity requires.

It may be a good thing to be reputed liberal, but liberality without the
reputation of it is hurtful. Display necessitates the imposition of
taxes, whereby the prince becomes hateful; whereas through parsimony his
revenue will be sufficient. Hence we have seen no princes accomplish
great results save those who have been accounted miserly.

Every prince should desire to be accounted merciful, not cruel; but a
new prince cannot escape a name for cruelty, for he who quells disorder
by a few signal examples will, in the end, be the more merc