uling tendencies, so that he forms judgments, not by his ruling
interest or conviction, but by the supposed impact of demographic data
on an empty brain. We have no grounds for confidence in these ruling
tendencies of our time. They are only the present phases in the endless
shifting of our philosophical generalizations, and it is only proposed,
by the application of social policy, to subject society to another set
of arbitrary interferences, dictated by a new set of dogmatic
prepossessions that would only be a continuation of old methods and
errors.

+103. Degenerate and evil mores. Mores of advance and decline.+ The case
is somewhat different when attempts are made by positive efforts to
prevent the operation of bad mores, or to abolish them. The historians
have familiarized us with the notion of corrupt or degenerate mores.
Such periods as the later Roman empire, the Byzantine empire, the
Merovingian kingdom, and the Renaissance offer us examples of evil
mores. We need to give more exactitude to this idea. Bad mores are those
which are not well fitted to the conditions and needs of the society at
the time. But, as we have seen, the mores produce a philosophy of
welfare, more or less complete, and they produce taboos which are
concentrated inhibitions directed against conduct which the philosophy
regards as harmful, or positive injunctions to do what is judged
expedient and beneficial. The taboos constitute morality or a moral
system which, in higher civilization, restrains passion and appetite,
and curbs the will. Various conjunctures arise in which the taboos are
weakened or the sanctions on them are withdrawn. Faith in the current
religion may be lost. Then its mystic sanctions cease to operate. The
political institutions may be weak or unfit, and the civil sanctions may
fail. There may not be the necessary harmony between economic conditions
and political institutions, or the classes which hold the social forces
in their hands may misuse them for their selfish interest at the expense
of others. The philosophical and ethical generalizations which are
produced by the mores rise into a realm of intellect and reason which is
proud, noble, and grand. The power of the intelligence is a human
prerogative. If the power is correctly used the scope of achievement in
the satisfaction of needs is enormously extended. The penalty of error
in that domain is correspondingly great. When the mores go wrong it is,
above all, on acc