5

Either, that all kinds of happiness are equally _high_ that do not
interfere with others 55

Or, that it is only a _high_ kind of happiness that can be shared
by all 56

Both of which suppositions are false 57

The conditions of social health are a moral end only when we
each feel a personal delight in maintaining them 58

In this case they will supply us with a _small portion_ of the
moral aid needed 59

But this case is not a possible one 60

There is indeed the natural impulse of sympathy that might tend
to make it so 61

But this is counterbalanced by the corresponding impulse of
selfishness 63

And this impulse of sympathy itself is of very limited power 63

Except under very rare conditions 63

The conditions of general happiness are far too vague to do more
than very slightly excite it 64

Or give it power enough to neutralise any personal temptation 66

At all events they would excite no enthusiasm 67

For this purpose there must be some prize before us, of recognised
positive value, more or less definite 67

And before all things, to be enjoyed by us individually 67

Unless this prize be of great value to begin with, its value will
not become great because great numbers obtain it 71

Nor until we know what it is, do we gain anything by the hope
that men may more completely make it their own in the future 72

The modern positive school requires a great general enthusiasm
for the general good 73

They therefore presuppose an extreme value for the individual
good 74

Our first enquiry must be therefore what the higher individual
good is 76

CHAPTER IV.

GOODNESS AS ITS OWN REWARD.

What has been said in the last chapter is really admitted by th