31

CHAPTER II.

MORALITY AND THE PRIZE OF LIFE.

The worth the positive school claim for life, is essentially a moral
worth 33

As its most celebrated exponents explicitly tell us 34

This means that life contains some special prize, to which morality
is the only road 34

And the value of life depends on the value of this prize 35

J.S. Mill, G. Eliot, and Professor Huxley admit that this is a
correct way of stating the case 36

But all this language as it stands at present is too vague to be of
any use to us 38

The prize in question is to be won in this life, if anywhere; and
must therefore be more or less describable 39

What then is it? 40

Unless it is describable it cannot be a moral end at all 41

As a consideration of the _raison d'etre_ of all moral systems will
show us 42

The value of the prize must be verifiable by positive methods 43

And be verifiably greater, beyond all comparison, than that of
all other prizes 44

Has such a prize any real existence? This is our question 44

It has never yet been answered properly 45

And though two sets of answers have been given it, neither of
them are satisfactory 45

I shall deal with these two questions in order 47

CHAPTER III.

SOCIOLOGY AS THE FOUNDATION OF MORALITY.

The positive theory is that the health of the social organism is
the real foundation of morals 49

But social health is nothing but the personal health of all the
members of the society 51

It is not happiness itself, but the negative conditions that make
happiness for all 51

Still less is social health any _high_ kind of happiness 54

It can only be maintained to be so, by supposing 5