eedom for himself, he could not rejoice in the sending
of troops to subjugate another people struggling against the same
tyrant?

Referring to the policy of the ministry, M. Szemere says "that Count
Louis Bathyanyi declared, on the 31st March, that the obligation
enjoined by the Pragmatic Sanction was such that Hungary was bound
thereby to defend the territorial integrity of the Austrian monarchy,
but that they (the ministers) would carefully avoid interfering in the
internal affairs of the states that constituted this monarchy."
Irrespective of this--that Count Bathyanyi explained the policy in
March, when Hungary enjoyed perfect peace, whereas the debate on the
Italian question happened in the midst of most threatening civil wars
carried on directly by Austria--it must be remembered that if by the 1st
article of the Pragmatic Sanction Hungary was bound to afford aid to
Austria _etiam contra vim externam_, that same article provided
that the States composing the realm of Hungary were to be preserved by
the monarch _aeque indivisibiliter_ as his hereditary estates; and
that by the 3d article of that celebrated law the Sovereign promised,
for himself and his successors, to compel his subjects of every state
and degree to observe the laws and rights of Hungary. It is therefore
evident that the infraction of this law, by the countenance and aid
furnished to the Serbs (as also to Jellachich), fully exonerated the
Hungarians from sending troops to Italy before they had provided for the
safety of their country, and fully justified them and their responsible
minister for drawing the attention of their Sovereign to it in the
address to the Crown. M. Szemere talks of protecting the integrity of
the Austrian empire, and carefully avoiding to interfere with the
internal affairs of other states. The Czar may indeed exclaim, with M.
Szemere, that in sending his Cossacks into Hungary he never intended to
interfere in our internal affairs.

The second charge, as to Kossuth's striving to concentrate in his person
all power and authority, is, I fear, indicative of the animus which
prompted M. Szemere to write these letters, namely, jealousy of his
great countryman. The charge, however, is entirely without foundation:
and the only question is, as to how Kossuth acquired such unbounded
influence over his countrymen of every rank and station. The means by
which Kossuth gained such an ascendancy over his colleagues, M. Szemere
himself mus