on before a prize court."

Mr. Phillimore, an English author and an authority on these questions,
and one of the judges in the Admiralty, expresses himself thus: "The
carrying of official despatches written by official personages on the
public affairs of one of the belligerents, _impresses a hostile
character on those bearing them_."

Sir William Scott is no less precise: "The transportation of two or
three shiploads of ammunition is necessarily a limited assistance; _but,
by despatches, the whole plan of the campaign may be transmitted in such
a manner as to destroy all the plans of the other belligerent in that
part of the world."_ And he dwells at length on this idea, insisting on
the incompatibility which exists between veritable neutrality and the
bearing of despatches, "which is an act of the most prejudicial and
hostile nature."

Let us also cite Mr. Jenkinson, afterwards Lord Liverpool. He
establishes in clear terms the fundamental principle of the matter by
putting this question, which plain good sense must answer: "Can it be
lawful for you to extend this right (that of the free navigation of
neutral vessels) in such a way as to injure me and to serve my enemy?"

Observe that the Queen, in her proclamation of neutrality, has been
careful not to omit the interdiction of the transport of despatches. She
therein declares that those who transport "officers, soldiers,
_despatches_, arms, ammunition, or any other article considered by law
and modern usage as contraband of war, for either of the contenders,
will do it at his own risk and peril, and will incur the high
displeasure of her Majesty."

Nothing can be more explicit, more consistent, and at the same time more
reasonable than these declarations. Sir William Scott is right in
saying, that, in undertaking to carry despatches, persons cease to be
neutrals and become enemies; this is evident, above all, in the present
conflict. As the serious chances of success of the South are all in
Europe, as it would not have revolted had it not counted on Europe, as
it would lay down its arms to-morrow if it were proved to it that never,
for cotton or any thing else, would Europe come to its aid, it follows,
thenceforth, that the despatches forwarded from the South to Europe
greatly surpass in military importance the sending of soldiers or
supplies.

This being so, what ought the commander of the packet _Trent_ to have
done? I do not impugn his intentions, he may have