notes (Ibid. page 150
(footnote).) their opinion with his usual candour, adds that "on the
general theory of evolution this is at least extremely improbable. It
is impossible to enter into the question here: much turns on the exact
connotation of the terms "conscience" and "moral sense," and on the
meaning we attach to the statement that the moral sense is fundamentally
identical with the social instincts."

Presumably the majority of those who approach the subjects discussed in
the third, fourth and fifth chapters of "The Descent of Man" in the full
conviction that mental phenomena, not less than organic phenomena,
have a natural genesis, would, without hesitation, admit that the
intellectual and moral systems of civilised man are ideal constructions,
the products of conceptual thought, and that as such they are, in
their developed form, acquired. The moral sentiments are the emotional
analogues of highly developed concepts. This does not however imply that
they are outside the range of natural history treatment. Even though
it may be desirable to differentiate the moral conduct of men from the
social behaviour of animals (to which some such term as "pre-moral" or
"quasi-moral" may be applied), still the fact remains that, as Darwin
showed, there is abundant evidence of the occurrence of such social
behaviour--social behaviour which, even granted that it is in large part
intelligently acquired, and is itself so far a product of educability,
is of survival value. It makes for that integration without which no
social group could hold together and escape elimination. Furthermore,
even if we grant that such behaviour is intelligently acquired, that
is to say arises through the modification of hereditary instincts and
emotions, the fact remains that only through these instinctive and
emotional data is afforded the primary tissue of the experience which is
susceptible of such modification.

Darwin sought to show, and succeeded in showing, that for the
intellectual and moral life there are instinctive foundations which a
biological treatment alone can disclose. It is true that he did not
in all cases analytically distinguish the foundations from the
superstructure. Even to-day we are scarcely in a position to do so
adequately. But his treatment was of great value in giving an impetus to
further research. This value indeed can scarcely be overestimated.
And when the natural history of the mental operations shall have been
wr