gency of
intelligence and will could be explained without any such intervention.
So, when later on, objective sociology declares that, even when
social phenomena are in question, all finalist preconceptions must be
distrusted if a science is to be constituted, it is to Darwin that its
thanks are due; he had long been clearing paths for it which lay
well away from the old familiar road trodden by so many theories of
evolution.
This anti-finalist doctrine, when fully worked out, was, moreover,
calculated to aid in the needful dissociation of two notions: that of
evolution and that of progress. In application to society these had long
been confounded; and, as a consequence, the general idea seemed to be
that only one type of evolution was here possible. Do we not detect
such a view in Comte's sociology, and perhaps even in Herbert Spencer's?
Whoever, indeed, assumes an end for evolution is naturally inclined to
think that only one road leads to that end. But those whose minds the
Darwinian theory has enlightened are aware that the transformations of
living beings depend primarily upon their conditions, and that it is
these conditions which are the agents of selection from among individual
variations. Hence, it immediately follows that transformations are not
necessarily improvements. Here, Darwin's thought hesitated. Logically
his theory proves, as Ray Lankester pointed out, that the struggle for
existence may have as its outcome degeneration as well as amelioration:
evolution may be regressive as well as progressive. Then, too--and this
is especially to be borne in mind--each species takes its good where
it finds it, seeks its own path and survives as best it can. Apply this
notion to society and you arrive at the theory of multilinear evolution.
Divergencies will no longer surprise you. You will be forewarned not to
apply to all civilisations the same measure of progress, and you will
recognise that types of evolution may differ just as social species
themselves differ. Have we not here one of the conceptions which mark
off sociology proper from the old philosophy of history?
But if we are to estimate the influence of Darwinism upon sociological
conceptions, we must not dwell only upon the way in which Darwin
impressed the general notion of evolution upon the minds of thinkers. We
must go into details. We must consider the influence of the particular
theories by which he explained the mechanism of this evolution. The
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