social action.
First, there is a subjective and an objective aspect of them all. It
would be easy to use terms of these interests in speculative arguments
in such a way as to shift the sense fallaciously from the one aspect to
the other; e.g., moral conduct, as an actual adjustment of the person in
question with other persons, is that person's "interest," in the
objective sense. On the other hand, we are obliged to think of something
in the person himself impelling him, however unconsciously, toward that
moral conduct, i.e., interest as "unsatisfied capacity" in the
subjective sense. So with each of the other interests. The fact that
these two senses of the term are always concerned must never be ignored;
but, until we reach refinements of analysis which demand use for these
discriminations, they may be left out of sight. Second, human interests
pass more and more from the latent, subjective, unconscious state to the
active, objective, conscious form. That is, before the baby is
self-conscious, the baby's essential interest in bodily well-being is
operating in performance of the organic functions. A little later the
baby is old enough to understand that certain regulation of his diet,
certain kinds of work or play, will help to make and keep him well and
strong. Henceforth there is in him a co-operation of interest in the
fundamental sense, and interest in the derived, secondary sense,
involving attention and choice. If we could agree upon the use of terms,
we might employ the word "desire" for this development of interest;
i.e., physiological performance of function is, strictly speaking, the
health interest; the desires which men actually pursue within the realm
of bodily function may be normal or perverted, in an infinite scale of
variety. So with each of the other interests. Third, with these
qualifications provided for, resolution of human activities into pursuit
of differentiated interests becomes the first clue to the combination
that unlocks the mysteries of society. For our purposes in this
argument we need not trouble ourselves very much about nice metaphysical
distinctions between the aspects of interest, because we have mainly to
do with interests in the same sense in which the man of affairs uses the
term. The practical politician looks over the lobby at Washington and he
classifies the elements that compose it. He says: "Here is the railroad
interest, the sugar interest, the labor interest, the army interest