itish seaplanes, it
was known, carried fuel sufficient only for a three-hours' flight; when
they had been gone for four and a half hours it was evident that they
were not likely to be in the air, so the cruiser and destroyer squadron,
after searching the waters of the Frisian coast, reluctantly shaped its
course for home. Commodore Tyrwhitt, in his report of the encounter with
the German aircraft, remarks that both Zeppelins practised the same
method of attack, namely, to get behind the line of ships and to drop
their bombs on the fore and aft line. Their speed was great, but they
seemed to suffer from one disability which made them clumsy to handle.
'It was repeatedly noted', he says, 'that the Zeppelins, when altering
course, invariably "wore", and did not appear to be able to turn head to
wind. This made them ridiculously easy to avoid in spite of their speed,
which was surprising.' That is to say, the Zeppelins did not tack.
Perhaps it was their policy to maintain rapid movement, so as not to
present a stationary target. To alter their course in the eye of the
wind they fell off from the wind and, after presenting their stern to
it, came up on the other side. 'The seaplane attacks', the commodore
adds, 'were of a much more active nature, but they do not appear to have
discovered the art of hitting.' German seaplanes, when they approached
end on, were very like British seaplanes, so the order was given to wait
for a bomb to be dropped before opening fire. This order caused
'considerable merriment' among the ships' companies. 'I am quite
convinced', says Commodore Tyrwhitt, 'that, given ordinary sea-room, our
ships have nothing to fear from seaplanes and Zeppelins.'
For eight hours, in perfect weather, the British squadron occupied
German waters just off the principal German naval ports. The Germans
knew the composition of the British force, and as visibility was
extraordinarily good they must have known also that there were no
supports; but their navy made no attempt to interfere with the British
ships.
Three of the four missing pilots returned, and were picked up by
submarine E 11, close to Norderney Gat. They were there attacked by a
hostile airship; the submarine, as soon as it had taken the pilots on
board, was forced to dive, and the machines were abandoned. The missing
pilot, Flight Commander F. E. T. Hewlett, had engine failure, and came
down on the sea near a Dutch trawler; he was picked up and detained fo
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