ed by any ecclesiastical law; and this I prove by three
arguments:--

1st. Those conditions which I have showed to be required in that thing
which the church may lawfully prescribe by a law, are not quadrant nor
competent to the cross, kneeling, surplice, holidays, &c.

For, 1. They are not mere circumstances, such as have place in all moral
actions, but sacred, mystical, significant, efficacious ceremonies, as
hath been abundantly shown in this dispute already. For example, Dr
Burges(895) calleth the surplice a religious or sacred ceremony. And
again,(896) he placeth in it a mystical signification of the pureness of
the minister of God. Wherefore the replier(897) to Dr Mortoune's
_Particular Defence_ saith well, that there is a great difference betwixt
a grave civil habit and a mystical garment.

2. It cannot be said that these ceremonies are of that kind of thing which
were not determinable by Scripture; neither will our opposites, for very
shame, adventure to say that things of this kind, to which cross,
kneeling, &c., do belong, viz., sacred significant ceremonies, left (in
their judgment) to the definition of the church, are almost infinite, and
therefore could not well and easily be determined in Scripture.

Since, then, such things as are not mere circumstances of worship can
neither be many nor various (as I said before), it is manifest that all
such things were easily determinable in Scripture.

3. Our ceremonial laws are not backed with such grounds and reasons as
might be for the satisfying and quieting of tender consciences, but we are
borne down with Will and authority; whereof I have said enough
elsewhere.(898)

_Sect._ 9. 2d. If the ceremonies be lawful to us because the law and
ordinance of the church prescribes them, then either the bare and naked
prescription of the church, having no other warrant than the church's own
authority, makes them to be thus lawful; or else the law of the church, as
grounded upon and warranted by the law of God and nature. Not the first;
for divines hold,(899) _legem humanum ferri ab hominibus, cum ratione
procedunt ab illis aliis antegressis legibus. Nam legis humanae regula
proxima est duplex. Una innata quam legem naturalem dicimus, altera
inspirata, quam divinam_, &c. _Ex his ergo fontibus lex humana procedit:
hoec incunabila illius a quibus si aberrat, lex degener est, indigna legis
nomine._ We have also the testimony of an adversary; for saith not Paybody
himself,