would have cost L20,000;
then it was the so-called Soudan railway, with a liability of not less
than three quarters of a million with which the Khedive wished to
saddle the Soudan, but Gordon would have neither, and his firmness
carried the day. When the Cairo authorities, in want of money, claimed
that the Soudan owed L30,000, he went into the items, and showed that,
instead, Cairo owed it L9000. He never got it, but by this he proved
that, while he was the servant of the Khedive, he would not be
subservient to him in matters that affected the successful discharge
of his task as that Prince's deputy in the Soudan.
We must now return to the revolt of Suleiman, the most serious
military peril Gordon had to deal with in Africa, which was in its
main features similar to the later uprising under the Mahdi. At the
first collision with that young leader of the slave-dealers, Gordon
had triumphed by his quickness and daring; but he had seen that
Suleiman was not thoroughly cowed, and he had warned him that if he
revolted again the result would inevitably be his ruin. Suleiman had
not taken the warning to heart, and was now in open revolt. His most
powerful supporters were the Arab colonies, long settled in interior
Africa, who, proud of their descent, were always willing to take part
against the Turco-Egyptian Government. These men rallied to a certain
extent to Suleiman, just as some years later they attached themselves
to the Mahdi. As General Gordon wrote in 1878: "They were ready, and
are still ready, to seize the first chance of shaking off the yoke of
Egypt." It was during Gordon's absence at Cairo that Suleiman's plans
matured, and he began the campaign by seizing the province of Bahr
Gazelle. Immediately on receiving this intelligence, General Gordon
fitted out an expedition; and as he could not take the command
himself, he intrusted it to his best lieutenant, Romolo Gessi, an
Italian of proved merit.
Natural difficulties retarded the advance of the expedition. Heavy
floods kept Gessi confined in his camp during three months, and the
lukewarm supporters of the Government regarded this inaction as proof
of inferiority. They consequently rallied to Suleiman, who soon found
himself at the head of a force of 6000 men, while Gessi had only 300
regulars, two cannon, and 700 almost useless irregulars. It was as
difficult for him to let the Governor-General know that he needed
reinforcements as it was for General Gordon to
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