contrasted groups--a _causal_ or
_mechanical_, and a _teleological_ or _vitalistic_. The latter has
prevailed generally in biology until now, and accordingly the animal and
vegetable kingdoms have been considered as the products of a creative
power, acting for a definite purpose. In the contemplation of every
organism, the unavoidable conviction seemed to press itself upon us,
that such a wonderful machine, so complicated an apparatus for motion as
exists in the organism, could only be produced by a power analogous to,
but infinitely more powerful than the power of man in the construction
of his machines."[3]
A little lower down he continues:--
"_I maintain with regard to_" this "_much talked of 'purpose in nature'
that it has no existence but for those persons who observe phenomena in
plants and animals in the most superficial manner_. Without going more
deeply into the matter, we can see at once that the rudimentary organs
are a formidable obstacle to this theory. And, indeed, anyone who makes
a really close study of the organization and mode of life of the various
animals and plants, ... must necessarily come to the conclusion, that
this 'purposiveness' no more exists than the much talked of
'beneficence' of the Creator."[4]
Professor Haeckel justly sees no alternative between, upon the one hand,
the creation of independent species by a Personal God--by a "Creator,"
in fact, who "becomes an organism, who designs a plan, reflects upon and
varies this plan, and finally forms creatures according to it, as a
human architect would construct his building,"[5]--and the denial of all
plan or purpose whatever. There can be no question but that he is right
here. To talk of a "designer" who has no tangible existence, no organism
with which to think, no bodily mechanism with which to carry his
purposes into effect; whose design is not design inasmuch as it has to
contend with no impediments from ignorance or impotence, and who thus
contrives but by a sort of make-believe in which there is no
contrivance; who has a familiar name, but nothing beyond a name which
any human sense has ever been able to perceive--this is an abuse of
words--an attempt to palm off a shadow upon our understandings as though
it were a substance. It is plain therefore that there must either be a
designer who "becomes an organism, designs a plan, &c.," or that there
can be no designer at all and hence no design.
We have seen which of these alternati
|