Some men would draw disparaging
comparisons between the mediaeval and the modern King. In the person of
the first was normally embodied the force paramount over all others in
the country, and on him was laid a weight of responsibility and toil so
tremendous, that his function seems always to border upon the
superhuman; that his life commonly wore out before the natural term; and
that an indescribable majesty, dignity, and interest surround him in his
misfortunes, nay, almost in his degradation; as, for instance, amidst

"The shrieks of death, through Berkeley's roof that ring,
Shrieks of an agonizing King."[12]

For this concentration of power, toil, and liability, milder realities
have now been substituted; and Ministerial responsibility comes between
the Monarch and every public trial and necessity, like armor between the
flesh and the spear that would seek to pierce it; only this is an armor
itself also fleshy, at once living and impregnable. It may be said, by
an adverse critic, that the Constitutional Monarch is only a depository
of power, as an armory is a depository of arms; but that those who wield
the arms, and those alone, constitute the true governing authority. And
no doubt this is so far true, that the scheme aims at associating in the
work of government with the head of the State the persons best adapted
to meet the wants and wishes of the people, under the conditions that
the several aspects of supreme power shall be severally allotted;
dignity and visible authority shall lie wholly with the wearer of the
crown, but labor mainly, and responsibility wholly, with its servants.
From hence, without doubt, it follows that should differences arise, it
is the will of those in whose minds the work of government is
elaborated, that in the last resort must prevail. From mere labor, power
may be severed; but not from labor joined with responsibility. This
capital and vital consequence flows out of the principle that the
political action of the Monarch shall everywhere be mediate and
conditional upon the concurrence of confidential advisers. It is
impossible to reconcile any, even the smallest, abatement of this
doctrine, with the perfect, absolute immunity of the Sovereign from
consequences. There can be in England no disloyalty more gross, as to
its effects, than the superstition which affects to assign to the
Sovereign a separate, and so far as separate, transcendental sphere of
political action. Anonymous s