gument
upon this subject I shall carefully avoid all abuse and ridicule.
Controversies are apt to be acrimonious. You, Sir, have certainly shewn
instances to the contrary. You have charity beyond your fellows in the
ecclesiastical line, and your answerers seem not to me to have a right
in fair argument to step out of the limits you have prescribed
yourself. To dispute with you is a pleasure equal almost to that of
agreeing with another person. You have candour enough to allow it
possible that an atheist may be a moral man. Where is that other
ecclesiastic who will allow the same? Your answerers ought also to
hold themselves precluded from using ridicule in handling this subject.
I am no great supporter of Lord Shaftesbury's doctrine that ridicule
is the test of truth. I own truth can never be ridiculous, that is,
it can never be worthy of laughter, but still it may be laughed at.
To use the other term, I may say, truth can never be worthy of ridicule,
but still it may be ridiculed. Just ridicule is a sufficient test
of truth; but after all we should be driven to an inquiry, upon
the principles of reasoning, whether the ridicule were just or not.
Boldness, which is not incompatible with decency and candour, I do
hold to be an absolute requisite in all speech and argument, where
truth is the object of inquiry. Therefore when I am asked, whether
there is a God or no God, I do not mince the matter, but I boldly
answer there is none, and give my reason for my disbelief; for I
adopt my friend's answer by the publication of it.
That mischief may ensue to society by such freedom of discussion is
also another argument for me to consider; I do not say to combat, for
though I were convinced or could not resist the argument that mischief
would ensue to society by such a discussion, yet I should think myself
intitled to enter into it. I have a right to truth, and to publish
truth, let society suffer or not suffer by it. That society which
suffers by truth should be otherwise constituted; and as I cannot well
think that truth will hurt any society rightly constituted, so I should
rather be inclined to doubt the force of the argument in case atheism
being found to be truth should apparently be proved prejudicial to such
a society.
I come unprejudiced to the question, and when I have promised you an
answer to your future Letters in support of revelation, I have neither
anticipated your argument nor prejudged the cause. I hold mysel
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