h distinguishes one of them from the other,
that is so manifest an error, that I need not lose time to contradict
it. Were there neither judge, taste, nor opinion in the world, yet
they would differ in their natures; for the action, character, and
language of tragedy, would still be great and high; that of comedy,
lower and more familiar. Admiration would be the delight of one, and
satire of the other.

I have but briefly touched upon these things, because, whatever his
words are, I can scarce imagine, that "he, who is always concerned for
the true honour of reason, and would have no spurious issue fathered
upon her," should mean any thing so absurd as to affirm, "that there
is no difference betwixt comedy and tragedy but what is made by the
taste only;" unless he would have us understand the comedies of my
lord L. where the first act should be pottages, the second fricassees,
&c. and the fifth a _chere entiere_ of women.

I rather guess he means, that betwixt one comedy or tragedy and
another, there is no other difference, but what is made by the liking
or disliking of the audience. This is indeed a less error than the
former, but yet it is a great one. The liking or disliking of the
people gives the play the denomination of good or bad, but does not
really make or constitute it such. To please the people ought to be
the poet's aim, because plays are made for their delight; but it does
not follow that they are always pleased with good plays, or that the
plays which please them are always good. The humour of the people is
now for comedy; therefore, in hope to please them, I write comedies
rather than serious plays: and so far their taste prescribes to
me. But it does not follow from that reason, that comedy is to be
preferred before tragedy in its own nature; for that, which is so in
its own nature, cannot be otherwise, as a man cannot but be a rational
creature: But the opinion of the people may alter, and in another age,
or perhaps in this, serious plays may be set up above comedies.

This I think a sufficient answer; if it be not, he has provided me of
an excuse: it seems, in his wisdom, he foresaw my weakness, and has
found out this expedient for me, "That it is not necessary for poets
to study strict reason, since they are so used to a greater latitude
than is allowed by that severe inquisition, that they must infringe
their own jurisdiction, to profess themselves obliged to argue well."

I am obliged to him fo