xceedingly to
undervalue human policy. Chance and folly counteract most of its wisdom.
From the "Memoires de Noailles"[2] I have learnt, that, between the
years 1740 and 1750, when I,--ay, and my Lord Chesterfield too,--had
such gloomy thoughts, France was trembling with dread of us. These are
general reasons. My particular ones are, that, if France meditated a
considerable blow, she has neglected her opportunity. Last year, we had
neither army nor a manned fleet at home. Now, we have a larger and
better army than ever we had in the island, and a strong fleet. Within
these three days, our West India and Mediterranean fleets, for which we
have been in great pain, are arrived, and bring not only above two
millions, but such a host of sailors as will supply the deficiencies in
our unequipped men-of-war. The country is covered with camps; General
Conway, who has been to one of them, speaks with astonishment of the
fineness of the men, of the regiments, of their discipline and
manoeuvring. In short, the French Court has taught all our young
nobility to be soldiers. The Duke of Grafton, who was the most indolent
of ministers, is the most indefatigable of officers. For my part, I am
almost afraid that there will be a larger military spirit amongst our
men of quality than is wholesome for our constitution: France will have
done us hurt enough, if she has turned us into generals instead of
senators.

[Footnote 1: The design of invading England, first conceived by Philip
II. of Spain and the Duke of Parma, had been entertained also by Louis
XIV.; and after Walpole's death ostentatious preparations for such an
expedition were made in 1805 by Napoleon. But some years afterwards
Napoleon told Metternich, the Austrian Prime Minister, that he had never
really designed to undertake the enterprise, being convinced of the
impossibility of succeeding in it, and that the sole object of his
preparations and of the camp at Boulogne had been to throw Austria off
her guard.]

[Footnote 2: The Duc de Noailles had been the French Commander-in-chief
at the battle of Dettingen in 1743.]

I can conceive another reason why France should not choose to venture an
invasion. It is certain that at least five American provinces wish for
peace with us. Nor can I think that thirteen English provinces would be
pleased at seeing England invaded. Any considerable blow received by us,
would turn their new allies into haughty protectors. Should we accept a
b