r Washington was
seldom even equal in number to that opposed to him. In the winter of
1776-1777, when his troops were only about four thousand strong, it is
difficult to understand how it was that Sir William Howe, with more than
double the number, should have failed to annihilate the American army.

In the winter of 1777-1778 the "dreadful situation of the army for want
of provisions" made Washington "admire" that they should not have been
excited to a general mutiny and desertion. In May, 1779, he hardly knew
any resource for the American cause except in reenforcements from
France, and did not know what might be the consequence if the enemy had
it in his power to press the troops hard in the ensuing campaign. In
December of that year his forces were "mouldering away daily," and he
considered that Sir Henry Clinton, with more than twice his numbers,
could "not justify remaining inactive with a force so superior." A year
later he was compelled for want of clothing to discharge levies which he
had so much trouble in obtaining, and "want of flour would have
disbanded the whole army" if he had not adopted this expedient. In
March, 1781, again, the crisis was "perilous," and, though he did not
doubt the happy issue of the contest, he considered that the period for
its accomplishment might be too far distant for a person of his years.

In April he wrote: "We cannot transport the provisions from the States
in which they are assessed to the army, because we cannot pay the
teamsters, who will no longer work for certificates. It is equally
certain that our troops are approaching fast to nakedness, and that we
have nothing to clothe them with; that our hospitals are without
medicines, and our sick without nutriment except such as well men eat;
and that our public works are at a stand and the artificers disbanding.
It may be declared in a word that we are at the end of our tether, and
that now or never our deliverance must come." Six months later, when
Yorktown capitulated, the British forces still remaining in North
America after the surrender of that garrison were more considerable than
they had been as late as February, 1779; and Sir Henry Clinton even then
declared that with a reenforcement of ten thousand men he would be
responsible for the conquest of America.

How shall we explain either puzzle--that England should have so nearly
missed success, to fail at last? or that America should have succeeded,
after having been alm