the
enemy's position there, but of the nature of the country to be
traversed. It is true that he had superficially looked over the ground,
once, from the top of the Pozo hill; but he could get, in that way, very
little accurate knowledge of the topography of the region, and still
less of the Spaniards' defensive strength.

Our only possible line of advance, in the center, was the
Siboney-Santiago road, which ran, through a dense jungle, down the
valley of the Aguadores River, crossed a small stream flowing into that
river from the north, then crossed the San Juan River, another
tributary of the Aguadores, and finally emerged from the forest directly
in front of the San Juan heights. The enemy, of course, knew exactly
where this road lay, and where it came out of the woods into the open
country; and they had so disposed their batteries and rifle-pits that
they could not only concentrate their fire upon the lower stretches and
the mouth of the road, but sweep with a hail-storm of projectiles the
whole margin of the forest where we should have to deploy and form our
attacking line. General Shafter had not ascertained these facts by means
of a reconnaissance, nor had he, apparently, considered such a state of
affairs as a contingency to be guarded against; but Mr. Richard Harding
Davis asserts that General Chaffee, commander of a brigade in General
Lawton's division, anticipated precisely this situation, and predicted,
five days before the battle, that if our men marched down this trail
into the open country they would be "piled up so high that they would
block the road." He thought that it would be much better to keep away
from the road altogether; cut trails parallel with the entire front of
the forest and hidden by it, with innumerable little trails leading into
the open; and then march the whole army out upon the hills through these
trails at the same moment. Whether this suggestion was ever made to the
commanding general or not, I do not know; but if it was, it failed to
commend itself to his judgment. I refer now--perhaps prematurely--to a
state of affairs in our immediate front which was not fully disclosed
until much later; but I do so because knowledge of it is absolutely
essential to a clear understanding of the way in which the battle of San
Juan was fought.

General Shafter's plan of operations, as outlined by Captain Lee,
British military attache, was substantially as follows: General Lawton's
division was t