But in one passage he suggests that
{120} possibly the world of matter and consciousness have the same
origin--the principle of life which is the great prius of all that is and
is to be. But Bergson's 'elan vital,' though more satisfactory than the
first cause of the naturalist, or the 'great unknown' of the
evolutionist, or even than some forms of the absolute, is itself
admittedly outside the pale of reason--inexplicable, indefinable, and
incalculable.

The new 'vitalism' unfolds a living self-evolving universe, a restless,
unfinished and never-to-be-finished development--the scope and goal of
which cannot be foreseen or explained. An infinite number of
possibilities open out; which the soul will follow no one can tell; why
it follows this direction rather than that, no one can see. There seems
to be no room here for teleology or purposiveness; and though Bergson has
not yet worked out the theological and ethical implications of his
theory, as far as we can at present say the personality and imminence of
a Divine Being are excluded. Though Bergson never refers to Hegel by
name, he seems to be specially concerned in refuting the philosophy of
the Absolute, according to which the world is conceived as the evolution
of the infinite mind. If 'tout est donne,' says Bergson, if all is given
beforehand, 'why do over again what has already been completed, thus
reducing life and endeavour to a mere sham.' But even allowing the force
of that objection, the idea of a 'world in the making,' though it appeals
to the popular mind, is not quite free from ambiguity. In one sense it
states a platitude--a truth, indeed, which is not excluded from an
absolute or teleological conception of life. But if it is implied that
the world, because it is in process of production, may violate reason and
take some capricious form, the idea is absurdly false, so long as we are
what we are, and the human mind is what it is. The real must always be
the rational. All enterprise and effort are based on the faith that we
belong to a rational world. Though we cannot predict what form the world
will ultimately take, we can at least be sure that it can assume no
character which will {121} contradict the nature of intelligence. Even
in the making of a world, if life has any moral worth and meaning at all,
there must be rational purpose. There are creation and initiative in man
assuredly, but they must not be interpreted as activities which devia