me
before the declaration of war he ordered all the secret documents and
the available money to be conveyed to Vienna, and entrusted to Holland
the care of our citizens; but Tisza told me long after that he
considered my reports of too pessimistic a tendency, and was afraid to
give orders for the _superfluous_ evacuation of Transylvania.
After the unexpected invasion, the waves of panic and rage ran high in
the Hungarian Parliament. The severest criticism was heaped upon me,
as no one doubted that the lack of preparation was due to my false
reports. Here Tisza was again himself when, in a loud voice, he
shouted out that it was untrue; my reports were correct; I had warned
them in time and no blame could be attached to me; he thus took upon
himself the just blame. Fear was unknown to him, and he never tried to
shield himself behind anyone. When I arrived back in Vienna after a
journey of some weeks in Russia, and only then heard of the incident,
I took the opportunity to thank Tisza for the honourable and loyal
manner in which he had defended my cause. He replied with the ironical
smile characteristic of him that it was simply a matter of course.
But for an Austro-Hungarian official it was by no means such a matter
of course. We have had so many cowards on the Ministerial benches, so
many men who were brave when dealing with their subordinates, toadied
to their superiors, and were intimidated by strong opposition, that a
man like Tisza, who was such a contrast to these others, has a most
refreshing and invigorating effect. The Roumanians attempted several
times to make the maintenance of their _neutrality_ contingent on
territorial concessions. I was always opposed to this, and at the
Ballplatz they were of the same opinion. The Roumanians would have
appropriated these concessions and simply attacked us later to obtain
more. On the other hand, it seemed to me that to gain _military
co-operation_ a cession of territory would be quite in order, since,
once in the field, the Roumanians could not draw back and their fate
would be permanently bound up with ours.
Finally, the third phase comprises the comparatively short period
between our defeat at Luck and the outbreak of the war in Roumania,
and was simply the death throes of neutrality.
War was in the air and could be foreseen with certainty.
As was to be expected, the inefficient diplomacy displayed in the
preparations for the world war brought down severe criti
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