Transylvania
originated in Hungary. But this opposition was not specially Tisza's,
for whichever of the Hungarian politicians might have been at the head
of the Cabinet he would have adopted the same standpoint.

I sent at that time a confidential messenger to Tisza enjoining him to
explain the situation and begging him in my name to make the
concession. Tisza treated the messenger with great reserve, and wrote
me a letter stating once for all that the voluntary cession of
Hungarian territory was out of the question; "whoever attempts to
seize even one square metre of Hungarian soil will be shot."

There was nothing to be done. And still I think that this was one of
the most important phases of the war, which, had it been properly
managed, might have influenced the final result. The military advance
on the flank of the Russian army would have been, in the opinion of
our military chiefs, an advantage not to be despised, and through it
the clever break through at Goerlitz would have had some results; but
as it was, Goerlitz was a strategical trial of strength without any
lasting effect.

The repellent attitude adopted by Hungary may be accounted for in two
ways: the Hungarians, to begin with, were averse to giving up any of
their own territory, and, secondly, they did not believe--even to the
very last--that Roumania would remain permanently neutral or that
sooner or later we would be forced to fight _against_ Roumania unless
we in good time carried her with us. In this connection Tisza always
maintained his optimism, and to the very last moment held to the
belief that Roumania would not dare take it upon herself to attack us.
This is the only reason that explains why the Roumanians surprised us
so much by their invasion of Transylvania and by being able to carry
off so much rich booty. I would have been able to take much better
care of the many Austrians and Hungarians living in Roumania--whose
fate was terrible after the declaration of war, which took them also
by surprise--if I had been permitted to draw their attention more
openly and generally to the coming catastrophe; but in several of his
letters Tisza implored me not to create a panic, "which would bring
incalculable consequences with it." As I neither did, nor could, know
how far this secrecy was in agreement with our military
counter-preparations, I was bound to observe it. Apparently, Burian
believed my reports to a certain extent; at any rate, for some ti