or its success. Should the belligerents be left to
themselves, I believe that it will succeed; but the web of political
intrigue which has grown around the question, fostered by hereditary
policy, imperial ambition, and private machination, render it difficult
to foretell the issue. The chances which render success probable are the
deference which France has of late shown to the wishes of England, the
want of union prevalent throughout the Austrian empire, and the internal
movement in Russia, which incapacitates her from doing mischief in this
part of Europe. Yet, let us not disguise from ourselves the self-evident
fact, that the views of Russia remain unaltered, that the policy of
Peter is still maintained inviolate, and that, although the last war may
have convinced her that actual self-aggrandisement will not be
tolerated, she still holds one object ever in view--the destruction of
Turkish supremacy on both banks of the Danube and the substitution of
dependent Slavism.

Throughout European Turkey, and nowhere more than in Montenegro, has her
influence waned since the Eastern war; yet so long as she shall possess,
and so freely use, the golden key, she must and will have very great
weight.

Of the three causes which, as I have said, tend to complicate the
Herzegovinian-Montenegrin question, private machinations have recently
been the most successful, and consequently the most injurious to order
and the general weal. The energy of some of the foreign employes has
been truly astounding, while their glib tongues and manoeuvring minds
have worked metamorphoses worthy of Robin or the Wizard of the North.
This distortion of facts was somewhat naively described by a French
colleague of M. Hecquard.[P]

'Montenegro,' said the former gentleman, 'c'est une invention de
Monsieur Hecquard.' Instances of such duplicity have been frequently
brought to light. These, while they reflect little credit on the
individual, speak badly for the good faith of the government
represented, as discovery is rarely followed by punishment--frequently
quite the reverse.

The high-handed policy which the Porte is now pursuing is the most
likely to be attended with beneficial results; for, as experience has
shown us, the system of concession is entirely useless, each addition to
their territory only making the Montenegrins the more grasping and more
avaricious. That a solution of the difficulty must in some way be
arrived at is clear. Should Turk