ut of their minds. Two of
them, Judges Marvin and Rafalsky, who were men of larger sympathies
and understanding, but of no greater political freedom, did feel that
Cowperwood had been badly used thus far, but they did not see what they
could do about it. He had put himself in a most unsatisfactory position,
politically and socially. They understood and took into consideration
his great financial and social losses which Steger described accurately;
and one of them, Judge Rafalsky, because of a similar event in his own
life in so far as a girl was concerned, was inclined to argue strongly
against the conviction of Cowperwood; but, owing to his political
connections and obligations, he realized that it would not be wise
politically to stand out against what was wanted. Still, when he and
Marvin learned that Judges Smithson, Rainey, and Beckwith were inclined
to convict Cowperwood without much argument, they decided to hand down a
dissenting opinion. The point involved was a very knotty one. Cowperwood
might carry it to the Supreme Court of the United States on some
fundamental principle of liberty of action. Anyhow, other judges in
other courts in Pennsylvania and elsewhere would be inclined to examine
the decision in this case, it was so important. The minority decided
that it would not do them any harm to hand down a dissenting
opinion. The politicians would not mind as long as Cowperwood was
convicted--would like it better, in fact. It looked fairer. Besides,
Marvin and Rafalsky did not care to be included, if they could help
it, with Smithson, Rainey, and Beckwith in a sweeping condemnation of
Cowperwood. So all five judges fancied they were considering the
whole matter rather fairly and impartially, as men will under such
circumstances. Smithson, speaking for himself and Judges Rainey and
Beckwith on the eleventh of February, 1872, said:

"The defendant, Frank A. Cowperwood, asks that the finding of the jury
in the lower court (the State of Pennsylvania vs. Frank A. Cowperwood)
be reversed and a new trial granted. This court cannot see that any
substantial injustice has been done the defendant. [Here followed
a rather lengthy resume of the history of the case, in which it was
pointed out that the custom and precedent of the treasurer's office, to
say nothing of Cowperwood's easy method of doing business with the city
treasury, could have nothing to do with his responsibility for failure
to observe both the spirit and