General Government upon each of these
points certainly present matter of the deepest interest. The first is,
however, of much the greatest importance, inasmuch as, in addition to
the dangers of unequal and improvident expenditures of public moneys
common to all, there is superadded to that the conflicting jurisdictions
of the respective governments. Federal jurisdiction, at least to the
extent I have stated, has been justly regarded by its advocates as
necessarily appurtenant to the power in question, if that exists by
the Constitution. That the most injurious conflicts would unavoidably
arise between the respective jurisdictions of the State and Federal
Governments in the absence of a constitutional provision marking out
their respective boundaries can not be doubted. The local advantages to
be obtained would induce the States to overlook in the beginning the
dangers and difficulties to which they might ultimately be exposed. The
powers exercised by the Federal Government would soon be regarded with
jealousy by the State authorities, and originating as they must from
implication or assumption, it would be impossible to affix to them
certain and safe limits. Opportunities and temptations to the assumption
of power incompatible with State sovereignty would be increased and
those barriers which resist the tendency of our system toward
consolidation greatly weakened. The officers and agents of the General
Government might not always have the discretion to abstain from
intermeddling with State concerns, and if they did they would not always
escape the suspicion of having done so. Collisions and consequent
irritations would spring up; that harmony which should ever exist
between the General Government and each member of the Confederacy would
be frequently interrupted; a spirit of contention would be engendered
and the dangers of disunion greatly multiplied.

Yet we all know that notwithstanding these grave objections this
dangerous doctrine was at one time apparently proceeding to its final
establishment with fearful rapidity. The desire to embark the Federal
Government in works of internal improvement prevailed in the highest
degree during the first session of the first Congress that I had the
honor to meet in my present situation. When the bill authorizing a
subscription on the part of the United States for stock in the Maysville
and Lexington Turnpike Company passed the two Houses, there had been
reported by the Committe