vengeance of offended authority, proffer local advantages and bring
in their train the patronage of the Government, we are, I fear, not so
safe. To suppose that because our Government has been instituted for the
benefit of the people it must therefore have the power to do whatever
may seem to conduce to the public good is an error into which even
honest minds are too apt to fall. In yielding themselves to this fallacy
they overlook the great considerations in which the Federal Constitution
was founded. They forget that in consequence of the conceded diversities
in the interest and condition of the different States it was foreseen at
the period of its adoption that although a particular measure of the
Government might be beneficial and proper in one State it might be the
reverse in another; that it was for this reason the States would not
consent to make a grant to the Federal Government of the general and
usual powers of government, but of such only as were specifically
enumerated, and the probable effects of which they could, as they
thought, safely anticipate; and they forget also the paramount
obligation upon all to abide by the compact then so solemnly and, as
it was hoped, so firmly established. In addition to the dangers to the
Constitution springing from the sources I have stated, there has been
one which was perhaps greater than all. I allude to the materials which
this subject has afforded for sinister appeals to selfish feelings, and
the opinion heretofore so extensively entertained of its adaptation to
the purposes of personal ambition. With such stimulants it is not
surprising that the acts and pretensions of the Federal Government in
this behalf should sometimes have been carried to an alarming extent.
The questions which have arisen upon this subject have related--

First. To the power of making internal improvements within the limits of
a State, with the right of territorial jurisdiction, sufficient at least
for their preservation and use.

Second. To the right of appropriating money in aid of such works when
carried on by a State or by a company in virtue of State authority,
surrendering the claim of jurisdiction; and

Third. To the propriety of appropriation for improvements of a
particular class, viz, for light-houses, beacons, buoys, public piers,
and for the removal of sand bars, sawyers, and other temporary and
partial impediments in our navigable rivers and harbors.

The claims of power for the