onger worthy your
attention."

I confess I am at a loss to conceive what could induce Napoleon to invent
such a story. He might have recollected his acquaintance with Madame
Grassini at Milan before the battle of Marengo. It was in 1800, and not
in 1805, that I was first introduced to her, and I know that I several
times took tea with her and Bonaparte in the General's apartments I
remember also another circumstance, which is, that on the night when I
awoke Bonaparte to announce to him the capitulation of Genoa, Madame
Grassini also awoke. Napoleon was charmed with Madame Grasaini's
delicious voice, and if his imperious duties had permitted it he would
have listened with ecstasy to her singing for hours together. Whilst
Napoleon was at Milan, priding himself on his double sovereignty, some
schemes were set on foot at Vienna and St. Petersburg which I shall
hereafter have occasion to notice. The Emperor, indeed, gave cause for
just complaint by the fact of annexing Genoa to the Empire within four
months after his solemn declaration to the Legislative Body, in which he
pledged himself in the face of France and Europe not to seek any
aggrandisement of territory. The pretext of a voluntary offer on the
part of Genoa was too absurd to deceive any one. The rapid progress of
Napoleon's ambition could not escape the observation of the Cabinet of
Vienna, which hegan to allow increased symptoms of hostility. The change
which was effected in the form of the Government of the Cisalpine
Republic was likewise an act calculated to excite remonstrance on the
part of all the powers who were not entirely subject to the yoke of
France. He disguised the taking of Genoa under the name of a gift, and
the possession of Italy under the appearance of a mere change of
denomination. Notwithstanding these flagrant outrages the exclusive
apologists of Napoleon have always asserted that he did not wish for war,
and he himself maintained that assertion at St. Helena. It is said that
he was always attacked, and hence a conclusion is drawn in favour of his
love of peace. I acknowledge Bonaparte would never have fired a single
musket-shot if all the powers of Europe had submitted to be pillaged by
him one after the other without opposition. It was in fact declaring war
against them to place them under the necessity of breaking a peace,
during the continuance of which he was augmenting his power, and
gratifying his ambition, as if in defiance of Europe.