d both these problems
are essentially matters for the Constitution of a State. To answer both of
them satisfactorily is the difficulty; and an examination of the
constitutions of other countries reveals that in few cases have they been
answered even to general satisfaction.
As for the constituency, it is clear that this cannot be the same as for
the first chamber, otherwise the two Houses are simply repetitions. That
is one consideration to be remembered. There is another. For from earliest
times mankind has desired to call into its special councils those who have
distinguished themselves in the conduct of its affairs. Folk may disagree
with such persons, but they defer to them and hear them. What may be
called the Senatorial Person is a recognised factor in the history of all
nations. In the push and jostle of entry to the First House--where special
and local interests are represented--such a Senatorial Person is most
likely to be thrust aside, even if he or she be inclined to mingle in the
fray. He is consequently lost to the councils of the nation. How shall a
place be found for him or for her; and when the place is found, what shall
be the measure of his or her counsel?
Other nations have answered these problems in divers ways. None has
answered them as they are answered in the Constitution of _Saorstat
Eireann_. For it is clear that if there is to be a Second Chamber, the
right place for such a Senatorial Person is in that Second Chamber, since
only thus is it possible to avoid making one chamber a mere copy of the
other. In some countries, therefore, the Second Chamber is composed of
persons on whom a title has been conferred--and on their children who
succeed to that title. In other countries the Second Chamber is created by
nomination--with at least the ostensible wish that only Senatorial Persons
will be appointed. Both these methods have led to corruption. Both,
moreover, have led to one fatal fault. For Second Chambers are mainly of
value at times when the First Chamber is likely to rush to a mistake; and
at such times no people are inclined to give careful heed to the counsel
of persons whom they have not themselves chosen to give that counsel. They
may be exactly such persons as they themselves would have chosen; but the
fact that they did not choose them, the fact that they came there by the
accident of birth, or the power of money, robs them of authority just when
their authority is most required.
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