e people; and behind them there will always
be the possibility of appeal to the whole nation by Referendum, which the
Senate can compel by a three-fifths vote. The Senate and the people,
therefore, are placed in a watchful alliance over the acts and
proceedings of the Dail. Indeed, it is not unlikely that in the future the
Senate and the people (by Referendum) will often be found in practical
alliance against any attempt of the Dail to arrogate power to itself. The
Senate has the power to make it so--a power of greater worth to it, and to
the nation, than any constitutional right arbitrarily to obstruct
legislation or to make legislation abortive.

IV.

THE PEOPLE AS LAW-MAKERS.

More is spoken of the two instruments of the Referendum and the Initiative
(particularly the former) than is known about them; for in the countries
where they have been adopted, folk use them and do not talk about them,
and where they have not been adopted folk talk about them with ardour or
with fear but without knowledge. Briefly they may be described as a
retention by the sovereign people of sovereign authority over the making
of laws.

The case is not without an historical parallel. In earlier times in other
states the sovereign was the king, who said, "L'Etat, c'est moi." He was
therefore the law-maker, by supreme right. He might summon the estates of
his realm--Lords and Commons--to advise and counsel him; and he might,
normally, allow their acts without his interference; but, being sovereign,
he reserved the right to cause those acts to be referred to him for the
final act of his will; and he at all times reserved the right to send a
message to them instructing them to make laws on matters that seemed to
him to require attention. This he did, being the sovereign. His parliament
was the legislature of the State, but he preserved the Referendum and the
Initiative, and held them as his sovereign authority over the authority
deputed to the legislature.

When, however, sovereignty passed to the people, they assumed the
attributes and the functions of that sovereignty. Where once the king's
person and the king's dwelling, for example, had been declared to be
inviolable, now (as in our Constitution) the people's persons and the
people's dwellings are declared to be inviolable. And where once the king
reserved the right to veto and to initiate legislation, so now (as again
in our Constitution) the people reserve the right to veto and to i