ts, as the McClellans, the Hallecks, the Sewards, Mr. Lincoln
has been at work; and at the best, they have shown their utter
incapacity, if not ill-will, to carry the war on vigorously and upon
strictly military principles. Many persons in Washington know that Mr.
Seward last winter firmly backed the _do-nothing_ strategy, in the
firm belief that the rebels would be worried out, and submit without
fighting. To those statesmen and Napoleons, Carnots, &c., it is as
impossible to manoeuvre with rapidity, to strike boldly and decidedly,
as to dance on their _well-furnished_ heads. Only such a good-natured
people as the Americans can expect _something_ from that whole
_caterva_. To expect from Mr. Lincoln's Napoleons, Carnots, &c.,
vigorous and rapid military operations, is the same as to mount
cavalry on thoroughly lame horses, and order it to charge _a fond de
train_.

The worshippers of McClellan peddle that the Antietam victory became
neutralized because the enemy fell back on its second and third line.
Whatever may be in this falling back on lines, and accepting all as it
is represented, one thing is certain, that when commanders win
victories, generally they give no time to the enemy to fall back in
order on its second and third lines. But every thing gets a new stamp
under the new Napoleon. A few hours after the Antietam battle, General
McClellan telegraphed that he "_knew not_ if the enemy retreated into
the interior or to the Potomac." O, O!

Many from among the European officers here have some experience of the
manoeuvring of large bodies--experience acquired on fields of battle,
and on reviews, and those camp manoeuvres annually practised all over
Europe. In this way the European officers, more or less, have the
_coup d'oeil_ for space and for the _terrain_, so necessary when an
army is to be put in positions on a field of battle, and which _coup
d'oeil_ few young American officers had the occasion to acquire. If
judiciously selected for the duties of the staffs, such European
officers would be of use and support to generals but for jealousy and
the West Point cliques.

During this whole war I hear every body, but above all the West Point
wiseacres and strategians, assert that charges with the bayonet and
hand-to-hand fighting are exceedingly rare occurrences in the course
of any campaign. It is useless to speak to all those great judges of
experience and of history.

In the account of the battles of Ligny an