n to carry the masses, and to avoid those disasters at
the polls! But stubbornness is not energy.

From a very reliable source I learn that a few days after the battle
of Antietam, General McClellan, or at least General or Colonel Marcy,
of McClellan's staff, insinuated to the President that General
McClellan would wish to be relieved from the command of the army, and
be assigned to quiet duties in Washington--very likely to supersede
Halleck. And the President seized not by the hairs the occasion to get
rid of the nation's nightmare, together with the pets of the commander
of the army of the Potomac. McClellan acted honestly in making the
above insinuation; he is now, in part at least, irresponsible for any
future disaster and blood.

_Oct. 20._--I have strong indications that European powers, as England
and France, are very sanguine to mediate, but would do it only if, and
when, _asked_ by our government. Those two governments, or some other
half-friendly, may, semi-officially, insinuate to Mr. Seward to make
such a demand. A few months ago, already Mr. Dayton wrote from Paris
something about such a step. Mr. Seward is desperate, downcast, and
may believe he can serve his country by committing the cabinet to some
such combination. I must warn Stanton and others.

In the Express and in the World the New York Herald found its masters
in ignominy.

More or less mean, contemptible ambition among the helmsmen, but
patriotism, patriotic ambition are below zero--here in Washington. For
the sake and honor of human nature, I pray to destiny Stanton may not
fail, and still count among the Wadsworths, the Wades, and the like
pure patriots.

The democratic elections and majorities united to Mr. Seward may
enforce a compromise, and God knows if Mr. Lincoln will oppose it to
the last. Then the only seeming salvation of the north will be the
indomitable decision of the rebels not to accept any terms except a
full recognition.

_Oct. 22._--The incapacity of the military wiseacres borders on
idiotism, if not on something worse. To do nothing McClellan absorbs
every man, and keeps one hundred and forty thousand men on the
Maryland side of the Potomac. Sigel has only a small command of twelve
thousand men, in a position where, with one quarter of what is useless
under McClellan, with his skill, his activity, and the _truly_
patriotic devotion of his troops, of his officers, and of the
commanders under him, Sigel would force the