ghts of others? And why
are we not to commit the one or invade the other? It is because it
inflicts pain or suffering, present or prospective, or cuts them off
from enjoyment which they might otherwise attain. The Creator has
sufficiently revealed to us that _happiness_ is the great end of
existence, the sole object of all animated and sentient beings. To this
he has directed their aspirations and efforts, and we feel that we
thwart his benevolent purposes when we destroy or impede that happiness.
This is the only _natural_ right of man. All other rights result from
the conventions of society, and these, to be sure, we are not to invade,
whatever good may appear to us likely to follow. Yet are we in no
instance to inflict pain or suffering, or disturb enjoyment, for the
sake of producing a greater good? Is the madman not to be restrained who
would bring destruction on himself or others? Is pain not to be
inflicted on the child, when it is the only means by which he can be
effectually instructed to provide for his own future happiness? Is the
surgeon guilty of wrong who amputates a limb to preserve life? Is not
the object of all penal legislation, to inflict suffering for the sake
of greater good to be secured to society?

By what right is it that man exercises dominion over the beasts of the
field; subdues them to painful labor, or deprives them of life for his
sustenance or enjoyment? They are not rational beings. No, but they are
the creatures of God, sentient beings, capable of suffering and
enjoyment, and entitled to enjoy according to the measure of their
capacities. Does not the voice of nature inform every one, that he is
guilty of wrong when he inflicts on them pain without necessity or
object? If their existence be limited to the present life, it affords
the stronger argument for affording them the brief enjoyment of which it
is capable. It is because the greater good is effected; not only to man
but to the inferior animals themselves. The care of man gives the boon
of existence to myriads who would never otherwise have enjoyed it, and
the enjoyment of their existence is better provided for while it lasts.
It belongs to the being of superior faculties to judge of the relations
which shall subsist between himself and inferior animals, and the use he
shall make of them; and he may justly consider himself, who has the
greater capacity of enjoyment, in the first instance. Yet he must do
this conscientiously, and no