very
"depths of infamy," when they can so clearly see that he merely trod in
the footsteps of George Washington.

If what a man lacks in reason he could only make up in rage, then, after
all, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Sumner is a very respectable
Senator; for, surely, the violence of his denunciations is almost as
remarkable as the weakness of his logic. Fortunately, however, it can
hurt no one except himself or those whom he represents. Certainly, the
brightest names in the galaxy of American statesmen are not to be swept
away by the filthy torrent of his invectives. The Clays, the Calhouns,
the Websters, and the Washingtons of America, are, indeed, as far above
the impotent rage of this Senator as the very stars of heaven are beyond
his arm.[220]

Sec. III. _The right of Trial by Jury not impaired by the Fugitive Slave
Law._

It is alleged that the power to enact such a law does not reside in
Congress, because no such power has been "expressly delegated," and
because it is not "necessary and proper" to carry any expressly
delegated authority into effect. We should have replied to this
argument; but it has been urged before every tribunal in which the great
question under consideration has been tried, and everywhere refuted. By
Mr. Justice Nelson, in the Supreme Court of New York,[221] by Mr.
Senator Bishop, in the Court of Errors in the same State,[222] and by
Mr. Justice Story, in the Supreme Court of the United States, it has
been so clearly, so powerfully, and so triumphantly demolished as to
leave nothing more to be desired on the subject. And besides, it has
been our object not so much to refute arguments against the law in
question, or to establish that which has been so long established,[223]
as to show on what slender grounds, and yet with what unbounded
confidence, the greatest champions of abolitionism are accustomed to
oppose the Constitution, the laws, the judicial decisions, and the
uniform practice, of the whole government under which we live.

In pursuance of this design, there is another sophism of theirs, which
it now devolves upon us to examine. We allude to the argument that the
Fugitive Slave Law is unconstitutional, because it denies the right of
trial by jury.

Is this still an open question? In the biography of Mr. Justice Story,
published by his son, it is said: "The argument that the Act of 1793 was
unconstitutional, because it did not provide for a trial by jury
accordi