nd to the supreme law of
the land, the language of an inspired apostle, that "whosoever shall
keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all."
He is guilty of all, because, by his willful disobedience in the one
instance, he sets at naught the authority by which the whole was
ordained and established.

In opposing the Fugitive Slave Law, it is forgotten by the abolitionists
that, if no such law existed, the master would have, under the
Constitution itself, the same right to reclaim his fugitive from labor,
and to reclaim him in the same summary manner; for, as we have seen, the
Supreme Court of the United States has decided that by virtue of the
Constitution alone the master has a right to pursue and reclaim his
fugitive slave, without even a writ or legal process. Hence, in opposing
the Fugitive Slave Law because it allows a summary proceeding in such
cases, the abolitionists really make war on the Constitution. The
battery which they open against the Constitution is merely masked behind
the Fugitive Slave Law; and thus the nature of their attack is concealed
from the eyes of their non-legal followers.

But, says Mr. Chase, of Ohio, I do not agree with the Supreme Court of
the United States. I oppose not the Constitution, but the decision of
the Supreme Court. "A decision of the Supreme Court," says he, "cannot
alter the Constitution." This is very true; but then, on the other
hand, it is equally true that neither can his opinion alter the
Constitution. But here the question arises, which is the rule of conduct
for the true and loyal citizen,--the decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States, or the opinion of Governor Chase? We decidedly prefer
the former. "Sir," says Mr. Chase, "when gentlemen from the slave States
ask us to support the Constitution, I fear they mean only their
_construction_ of the Constitution." We mean not so. We mean neither
_our_ nor _his_ construction of the Constitution, but that construction
only which has been given to it by the highest judicial tribunal in the
land, by the supreme and final arbiter in all such conflicts of opinion.

But Mr. Chase opposes argument as well as opinion to the decision of the
Supreme Court in regard to slavery. "What more natural," says he, "than
that gentlemen from the slave States, in view of the questions likely to
come before the Supreme Court, should desire that a majority of its
members might have interests like those which th