productive of decisive results, and especially of
the one particular result which is the object of all naval action--the
destruction of the enemy's organized force, and the establishment of
one's own control of the water; nevertheless, the ensuing movements of
Yeo and Chauncey constituted a naval campaign of considerable
interest. Nothing resembling it occurred on either Lake Champlain or
Erie, and no similar condition recurred on Ontario. The fleets were
frequently in presence of each other, and three times came to blows.
On Erie and on Champlain the opposing forces met but once, and then
without any prolonged previous attempts at manoeuvring. They fought
immediately; the result in each case being an American victory, not
only complete but decisive, which has kept their remembrance alive to
this day in the national memory. On Ontario, after the close of the
season of 1813, the struggle resolved itself into a race of
ship-building; both parties endeavoring to maintain superiority by the
creation of ever-increasing numbers, instead of by crushing the enemy.
Such a contest sufficiently befits a period of peace; it is, for
instance, at this moment the condition of the great naval nations of
the world, each of which is endeavoring to maintain its place in the
naval scale by the constant production and development of material. In
war, however, the object is to put an end to a period of national
tension and expense by destroying the enemy; and the failure of the
commanders to effect this object calls for examination.

The indecisive result on Ontario was due to the particular composition
of the two squadrons; to the absence of strong compelling conditions,
such as made fighting imperative on Barclay upon Erie, and perhaps
also on Downie upon Champlain; and finally, to the extreme wariness of
the commanders, each of whom was deeply impressed with the importance
of preserving his own fleet, in order not to sacrifice control of the
lake. Chauncey has depicted for us his frame of mind in instructions
issued at this very moment--July 14--to his subordinate, Perry. "The
first object will be to destroy or cripple the enemy's fleet; but in
all attempts upon the fleet you ought to use great caution, for the
loss of a single vessel may decide the fate of the campaign."[69] A
practical commentary of singular irony was passed upon this utterance
within two months; for by sacrificing a single ship Perry decided his
own campaign in his own