40'. The first convention for joint occupancy
had been negotiated while Mr. Adams was secretary of State, and
the second while he was President; so that, in addition to the
weight of authority with which he always spoke, his words seemed
entitled to special confidence on a question with which he was
necessarily so familiar. His great influence brought many Whigs
to the support of the resolution; and on the 9th of February, 1846,
the House, by the large vote of 163 to 54, declared in favor of
giving the treaty notice to Great Britain.

The country at once became alarmed by the growing rumors that the
resolution of the House was a direct challenge to Great Britain
for a trial of strength as to the superior title to the Oregon
country, and it was soon apparent that the Senate would proceed
with more circumspection and conservatism. Events were rapidly
tending toward hostilities with Mexico, and the aggrandizement of
territory likely to result from a war with that country was not
viewed with a friendly eye, either by Great Britain or France.
Indeed, the annexation of Texas, which had been accomplished the
preceding year, was known to be distasteful to those governments.
They desired that Texas might remain an independent republic, under
more liberal trade relations than could be secured from the United
States with its steady policy of fostering and advancing its own
manufacturing interests. The directors of the administration saw
therefore more and more clearly that, if a war with Mexico were
impeding, it would be sheer madness to open a quarrel with Great
Britain, and force her into an alliance against us. Mr. Adams and
those who voted with him did not believe that the notice to the
British Government would provoke a war, but that firmness on our
part, in the negotiation which should ensue, would induce England
to yield her pretensions to any part of Oregon; to which Mr. Adams
maintained, with elaboration of argument and demonstration, she
had no shadow of right.

Mr. Adams was opposed to war with Mexico, and therefore did not
draw his conclusions from the premises laid down by those who were
charged with the policy of the administration. They naturally
argued that a war with Great Britain might end in our losing the
whole of Oregon, without acquiring any territory on our south-
western border. The bare possibility of such a result would defeat
the policy which they were seeking to uphold, and would at the same