e against successful rebellion,
hardly admits of question. The difference between the abortive revolt of
1848 or the Fenian disturbances of 1866, and the desperate insurrection
of 1798, affords some measure of the strength which the legislative
unity of the kingdom has added to the English Crown. If it be suggested
that the disloyalty which has prompted sedition during this century was
less deep than the animosities which armed the insurgents of '98, the
suggestion may be true, but it incidentally shows that under the Union
some progress, however slight, has been made towards national harmony,
and recalls the important fact that at the present day the wealth and
the energy of Protestant Ireland firmly support the legislative unity of
the kingdom. Consider again what are the facilities possessed, say, by
the State of New York, by the kingdom of Bavaria, or by the Cape Colony
for interfering with or arresting the action of the central power to
which the State, kingdom, or dependency is subject, and you perceive at
once how ample must, from the very necessity of the case, be the
opportunities possessed by a semi-independent Irish executive
representing a semi-independent Irish Parliament for embarrassing the
action of the Government in London. This will appear more clearly from a
detailed examination of the different forms which may be assumed by Home
Rule. One remark, however, may with advantage be made at this point of
our argument, since it holds good of every possible scheme for repealing
or modifying the Union. Powers conferred upon an executive and a
Parliament at Dublin must from the nature of things be a deduction from
the powers which can be exercised by the Parliament and Ministry at
Westminster. This is a principle the truth of which is independent of
the wishes or fancies either of Englishmen or of Irishmen. "The more you
have of the more," runs a quaint Spanish proverb, "the less you have of
the less." The saying is of mathematical certainty, but the depth and
variety of its application are constantly forgotten in the excitement of
controversy.

[Sidenote: Enables it to maintain freedom.]

To the existence of the Union and to the power which it confers upon the
executive, is due the possibility of curbing the violence of religious
and political zealots by the interposition of an authority endowed at
once with overpowering strength and obvious impartiality. In Belfast
even a Nationalist must, if he is a peacea