Both sides spent the winter and spring of 1565 in preparations for
the great attack. The Grand Master sent a message to all the Powers
of Europe; but Philip II., who sent him some troops, and the Pope,
who sent him 10,000 crowns, alone responded to his appeal. The message
sent to the various commanderies[2] throughout Europe brought the
Knights in haste to the defence of their beloved Convent. The Maltese
Militia was organised and drilled and proved of great value in the
siege, and even 500 galley slaves were released on promise of faithful
service. Altogether La Valette seems to have had at his disposal about
9,000 men (though the authorities differ slightly as to the exact
figures). Of these over 600 were Knights with their attendants, about
1,200 were hired troops, about 1,000 were volunteers, chiefly from
Italy, and the remainder Maltese Militia and galley slaves.
The Turkish fleet at the beginning consisted of 180 vessels, of which
130 were galleys; and the troops on board consisted of about 30,000
men, of whom 6,000 belonged to the select troops of the Janissaries.
Twice during the siege the Ottomans received reinforcements: first,
Dragut himself with 13 galleys and 1,600 men, and later, Hassan,
Viceroy of Algiers and son of Khair-ed-Din Barbarossa, with 2,500
Corsairs. Altogether the Ottoman forces at the maximum, inclusive of
sailors, must have exceeded 40,000 men. A small reinforcement of 700
men, of whom 42 were Knights, contrived to steal through the Turkish
lines on June 29; but that was all the help the garrison received
before September.
[Illustration: PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE SIEGE OF MALTA 1565]
The Turkish army was under the command of Mustapha Pasha, and the
fleet under that of Piali. Both had received orders not to take any
steps without the advice of Dragut. It would have been far better for the
Turkish cause had the Corsair been in supreme command, for his skill
as an artilleryman was famous. But there had always been trouble in
the Ottoman fleet when a Corsair was in command. The proud Turkish
generals were unwilling to be under the orders of men who were of
doubtful antecedents, and whom they despised in their hearts as
low-born robbers. Even Barbarossa, acknowledged by all to be the
greatest seaman in the Turkish Empire, could not enforce strict
obedience in the campaign of Prevesa in 1538. The Grand Vizier Ibrahim
had seen the folly of putting generals in command of fleets, and had
therefore
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