o perfect our
small navy and our minute army, I do not think it necessary to increase
the number of our ships--at any rate as things look now--nor the number
of our soldiers. Of course our navy must be kept up to the highest
point of efficiency, and the replacing of old and worthless vessels by
first-class new ones may involve an increase in the personnel; but not
enough to interfere with our action along the lines you have suggested.
But before I would know how to advocate such action, save in some such
way as commending it to the attention of The Hague Tribunal, I would
have to have a feasible and rational plan of action presented.

It seems to me that a general stop in the increase of the war navies
of the world _might_ be a good thing; but I would not like to speak too
positively offhand. Of course it is only in continental Europe that the
armies are too large; and before advocating action as regards them I
should have to weigh matters carefully--including by the way such a
matter as the Turkish army. At any rate nothing useful can be done
unless with the clear recognition that we object to putting peace second
to righteousness.

Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

HON. CARL SCHURZ, Bolton Landing, Lake George, N. Y.

In my own judgment the most important service that I rendered to
peace was the voyage of the battle fleet round the world. I had become
convinced that for many reasons it was essential that we should have
it clearly understood, by our own people especially, but also by other
peoples, that the Pacific was as much our home waters as the Atlantic,
and that our fleet could and would at will pass from one to the other of
the two great oceans. It seemed to me evident that such a voyage would
greatly benefit the navy itself; would arouse popular interest in and
enthusiasm for the navy; and would make foreign nations accept as a
matter of course that our fleet should from time to time be gathered in
the Pacific, just as from time to time it was gathered in the Atlantic,
and that its presence in one ocean was no more to be accepted as a mark
of hostility to any Asiatic power than its presence in the Atlantic
was to be accepted as a mark of hostility to any European power. I
determined on the move without consulting the Cabinet, precisely as
I took Panama without consulting the Cabinet. A council of war never
fights, and in a crisis the duty of a leader is to lead and not to take
refuge behind the generall