ommission, of which the American
members were Senators Lodge and Turner, and Secretary Root, we were able
peacefully to settle the Alaska Boundary question, the only question
remaining between ourselves and the British Empire which it was not
possible to settle by friendly arbitration; this therefore represented
the removal of the last obstacle to absolute agreement between the two
peoples. We were of substantial service in bringing to a satisfactory
conclusion the negotiations at Algeciras concerning Morocco. We
concluded with Great Britain, and with most of the other great nations,
arbitration treaties specifically agreeing to arbitrate all matters,
and especially the interpretation of treaties, save only as regards
questions affecting territorial integrity, national honor and vital
national interest. We made with Great Britain a treaty guaranteeing the
free use of the Panama Canal on equal terms to the ships of all nations,
while reserving to ourselves the right to police and fortify the canal,
and therefore to control it in time of war. Under this treaty we are
in honor bound to arbitrate the question of canal tolls for coastwise
traffic between the Western and Eastern coasts of the United States. I
believe that the American position as regards this matter is right; but
I also believe that under the arbitration treaty we are in honor
bound to submit the matter to arbitration in view of Great Britain's
contention--although I hold it to be an unwise contention--that our
position is unsound. I emphatically disbelieve in making universal
arbitration treaties which neither the makers nor any one else would for
a moment dream of keeping. I no less emphatically insist that it is our
duty to keep the limited and sensible arbitration treaties which we have
already made. The importance of a promise lies not in making it, but in
keeping it; and the poorest of all positions for a nation to occupy in
such a matter is readiness to make impossible promises at the same time
that there is failure to keep promises which have been made, which can
be kept, and which it is discreditable to break.

During the early part of the year 1905, the strain on the civilized
world caused by the Russo-Japanese War became serious. The losses of
life and of treasure were frightful. From all the sources of information
at hand, I grew most strongly to believe that a further continuation
of the struggle would be a very bad thing for Japan, and an even wo