ersable road, and so effecting the desired movement quietly.
But the height of folly seems to have been reached when he threw into
the path of the enemy a large body of troops which were still too weak
to cope with him. As a matter of fact, this body of cavalry, owing to
their very numbers, could not help covering a large space of ground;
and when it became necessary to retire, had to cling to a series of
difficult positions in succession, so that they lost not fewer than
twenty horsemen. (50) It was thus the Thebans effected their object and
retired from Peloponnese.

(49) See "Hipparch." viii. 10 foll.

(50) See Diod. xv. 63; Plut. "Pelop." 24.

BOOK VII

I

B.C. 369. In the following year (1) plenipotentiary ambassadors (2) from
the Lacedaemonians and their allies arrived at Athens to consider and
take counsel in what way the alliance between Athens and Lacedaemon
might be best cemented. It was urged by many speakers, foreigners and
Athenians also, that the alliance ought to be based on the principle of
absolute equality, (3) "share and share alike," when Procles of Phlius
put forward the following argument:

(1) I.e. the official year from spring to spring. See Peter, "Chron.
Table" 95, note 215; see Grote, "H. G." x. 346, note 1.

(2) See Hicks, 89.

(3) For the phrase {epi toi isois kai omoiois}, implying "share and
share alike," see Thuc. i. 145, etc.

"Since you have already decided, men of Athens, that it is good to
secure the friendship of Lacedaemon, the point, as it appears to me,
which you ought now to consider is, by what means this friendship may be
made to last as long as possible. The probability is, that we shall hold
together best by making a treaty which shall suit the best interests of
both parties. On most points we have, I believe, a tolerable unanimity,
but there remains the question of leadership. The preliminary decree of
your senate anticipates a division of the hegemony, crediting you with
the chief maritime power, Lacedaemon with the chief power on land; and
to me, personally, I confess, that seems a division not more established
by human invention than preordained by some divine naturalness or happy
fortune. For, in the first place, you have a geographical position
pre-eminently adapted for naval supremacy; most of the states to whom
the sea is important are massed round your own, and all of these are
inferior to you in strength. Besides, you have harbours